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Abstract. Where there is trust, there is also vulnerability, and vulnerability can be exploited. 
Epistemic trust is no exception. This chapter maps the phenomenon of the exploitation of 
epistemic trust. I start with a discussion of how trust in general can be exploited; a key 
observation is that trust incurs vulnerabilities not just for the party doing the trusting, but also 
for the trustee (after all, trust can be burdensome), so either party can exploit the other. I apply 
these considerations to epistemic trust, specifically in testimonial relationships. There, we 
standardly think of a hearer trusting a speaker. But we miss an important aspect of this 
relationship unless we consider too that the speaker standardly trusts the hearer. Given this 
mutual trust, and given that both trustees and trusters can exploit each other, we have four 
possibilities for exploitation in epistemic-trust relationships: a speaker exploiting a hearer (a) 
by accepting his trust or (b) by imposing her trust on him, and a hearer exploiting a speaker 
(c) by accepting her trust or (d) by imposing his trust on her. One result is that you do not 
need to betray someone to exploit him – you can exploit him just as easily by doing what he 
trusts you for. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Relationships of trust incur vulnerability, and vulnerability can be exploited. Epistemic trust is 
no exception. This chapter maps out four forms of exploitation in epistemic-trust relationships 
involving testimony. Several theses of relevance to social epistemology emerge. 
 One important form of trust in testimony consists in a hearer trusting a speaker for 
knowledge: he believes what she says on the basis of the fact that she says it, making himself 
vulnerable to insincerity or error on her part. Less discussed but equally important is that 
speakers standardly trust hearers too: testifying makes a speaker vulnerable in various ways, 
for example to not being taken seriously (Hinchman 2005; Dotson 2011; M. Fricker 2007; 
Frost-Arnold 2016; Medina 2013); so a speaker standardly trusts her hearer for epistemic 
recognition. Since both hearers and speakers are vulnerable in their capacity as trusters, each 
can have their trust exploited by the other.  
 But it is not just a trustee who can exploit a truster – a truster can also exploit someone 
whom he trusts. After all, accepting trust is burdensome: it incurs an obligation and so makes 
a trustee vulnerable to difficulties that may arise in discharging it. This holds for both parties 
to a testimonial relationship: a hearer, in his capacity as a truster, can exploit a speaker by 
imposing his trust for knowledge on her, and a speaker, in her capacity as a truster, can 
exploit a hearer by imposing on him her trust for epistemic recognition. Since both speakers 
and hearers are vulnerable in their capacity as trustees, each can be exploited in their 
acceptance of the other’s trust.  
  Four possibilities for epistemic exploitation in relationships of testimony have emerged: 
(a) A speaker can exploit a hearer by accepting his trust for knowledge or (b) by imposing on 
him her trust for epistemic recognition, and (c) a hearer can exploit a speaker by accepting her 
trust for recognition or (d) by imposing his trust for knowledge on her.  
  One might think that exploiting a truster – forms (a) and (c) – involves betraying him (or 
at least letting him down). One might also think that exploiting a trustee – forms (b) and (d) – 
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involves imposing your trust under false pretenses (for example, pretending to trust when you 
are really out to manipulate). These two suggestions are right insofar as betrayal and deceit 
are much loved tools of exploitation. But as we will see, they are not necessary: a trustee can 
exploit a truster by fulfilling his trust, and a truster can exploit a trustee by trusting her in 
good faith.  
 This chapter forges links between discussions about trust in general (Baier 1986, 1991; 
Jones 2004; Hinchman 2017; Hawley 2014), about testimony (E. Fricker 2006; M. Fricker 
2007; Goldberg, unpublished manuscript; Hinchman 2005), and about the epistemic effects of 
power dynamics in social contexts (M. Fricker 2007; Mills 2007; Spelman 2007; Dotson 
2011, 2012, 2014; Medina 2013; Berenstain 2016; Frost-Arnold 2014). Section 2 discusses 
trust and exploitation in non-epistemic settings. Section 3 introduces exploitative trust in 
testimony. Section 4 discusses how a speaker can epistemically exploit a hearer, and section 5 
how a hearer can return the favor. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Exploitative Trust 
 
2.1 Trust  
 
The form of trust at issue is interpersonal: one person trusts another person. It is also a three-
place relation: one person trusts another for some end. Trust involves relying on the trustee 
for the end in question; but trust is more than reliance, for you can rely on a person without 
trusting him. You can rely on me not to steal your cake, on the grounds that I wouldn’t touch 
lemon drizzle anyway. But if your cake is amaretto, which you know is my favorite, then you 
cannot merely rely on me – you had better trust me. The difference? Mere reliance is a matter 
of planning on someone’s predictable behavior, whereas trust involves a cooperative 
relationship, in which she accepts your trust.  
  One characteristic feature of this relationship is that it is governed by special norms, 
above and beyond the norms governing mere reliance (Baier 1986, 1991; Holton 1994; 
Becker 1996; Jones 2004; Hinchman 2005; Faulkner 2007; Nickel 2007; Darwall 2017). We 
can see this by imagining that I do steal your cake. If you were merely relying on me not to 
(as in the lemon-drizzle case), I violate the moral prohibition on stealing, but nothing more – I 
might not even know the cake is yours. When you trust me (as in the amaretto case), I violate 
this prohibition, but I also violate a second norm: I betray your trust.  
  Trust relationships come with their own package of norms. One mandates that the trustee 
do whatever she can, within reason, to come through for the truster (Hinchman 2017); I’ll 
refer to this as the trying-your-best-within-reason norm. Another, which I’ll call the 
authenticity norm, forbids either party from deceiving the other (Frost-Arnold 2014, 791). 
Additional norms permit (or perhaps mandate) reactive attitudes, such as feelings of betrayal 
or gratitude (Baier 1986; Ruokonen 2013; Holton 1994).  
  What sort of norms are the norms of trust? I suggest (and others agree1) that they are for 
the most part a special kind of moral norm, making the betrayal or letting down of trust a 
special kind of moral violation. This might sound strange – for surely it can be good to betray 
trust and bad to fulfill it, for example when it sustains a mafia or other immoral enterprise 
(Baier 1986; Frost-Arnold 2014; Jones 2017). But this observation does not show that the 
norms of trust are not moral; it shows only that they are pro tanto: they can be outweighed by 
stronger moral norms.  
  A second distinguishing feature of trust, beyond having special norms, is that it is 
characterized by a certain psychological profile. The truster for his part premises his reliance 
on the trustee on the assumption that she will be responsive to some aspect of their trust 
 
1 Baier (1986), McLeod (2000), Nickel (2007), Faulkner (2011), Ruokonen (2013), and Darwall (2017) take the 
norms of trust to be moral; Jones (2017) argues that they are not. 
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relationship. This might be himself personally (Baier 1986; Darwall 2017), the fact that he is 
depending on her (Jones 1996; Faulkner 2011), a shared project (Baier ibid.), or simply the 
obligation or commitment that she has incurred by accepting his trust (Nickel 2007; Hawley 
2014). A trustee who accepts the trust, for her part, characteristically is responsive in these 
ways.  
 Although thinner construals of trust relationships are possible (see the Introduction), I will 
characterize them in terms of the abovementioned norms and psychological profile. For my 
aim is to show that relationships of trust are compatible with exploitation; if I can show this 
for a strong notion of trust, it will automatically hold for weaker ones. 
  In preparation for the following we must clarify how a trust relationship might succeed or 
fail. In the paradigm case of a trust relationship gone right, one party trusts another in good 
faith, and the latter, doing her best within reason, delivers the end that she is being trusted for. 
For example, I fulfill your trust to pick you up at the airport by double-checking your arrival 
time, leaving in time to beat the traffic, and waiting at our arranged spot. In such cases we 
may say that the trustee has fulfilled the trust. 
  We may contrast this with two ways in which the trustee may fail to fulfill the trust: by 
disappointing it or by betraying it.2 One disappoints trust by failing to deliver the end in 
question. One betrays it by not trying one’s best, within reason, to come through (thus 
violating the trying-your-best-within-reason norm). Disappointment and betrayal often 
overlap, but neither entails the other. In our airport case, I would disappoint your trust by 
failing to turn up. If I do this because I failed to try my best (say, I lost track of time because I 
was engrossed in a novel), then it is also a betrayal. But some disappointments of trust are not 
betrayals (Hinchman 2017): I might fail to make it to the airport because I had a flat tire or 
had to witness to a car accident. Similarly, one can – at least arguably – betray trust without 
disappointing it (Hinchman ibid.). For example, I could pick you up at the airport after all, but 
accidentally: having forgotten our arrangement, I went there seeking my lost briefcase and 
happened to see you waiting. Although I delivered the end that you were trusting me for, I did 
it despite my carelessness, and so arguably wound up betraying you (even if you never find 
out).  
  To simplify matters, in the cases discussed below, all betrayals of trust will also be 
disappointments: the trustee’s culpable behavior will result in her failing to deliver the end 
that she is being trusted for; and all cases in which the trustee delivers the end in question, it 
will be a case of trust fulfillment: he will have delivered it by trying his best within reason.  
  An important issue in the following concerns what distinguishes a relationship as one of 
trust. This matters, because I want to show that bona fide trust relationships can be 
exploitative – and I want to do so without needing to appeal to borderline cases. I have 
already said that trust is governed by special norms and is characterized by a cooperative, 
other-directed psychology. Yet sometimes a case might diverge from the ideal without 
thereby ceasing to count as a relationship of trust. For example, the truster might violate the 
“no-nagging” norm too much, or the trustee may flag in his sense of obligation or enthusiasm 
for the common project. Yet I will suppose that a necessary condition for a relationship to 
count as one of trust is that both parties obey the authenticity norm: both agree, and intend, to 
abide by the norms of trust. This criterion for bona fide trust includes any relationship in 
which the trust is fulfilled, but it also includes some cases in which it is betrayed: namely, 
those in which the betrayal is unintentional. Cases of intentional betrayal, by contrast, do not 
count as trust relationships – for the trustee cannot truly be said to accept the other’s trust. 
That bona fide trust relationships admit of exploitation should not come as a surprise. For 
interpersonal relationships, including trust relationships, encompass many dimensions of 
 
2 (Darwall 2017) argues that trust, because it is more like love than obligation, cannot be betrayed, but only let 
down. I will stick with the notion of betrayal, but the notion of letting down could easily be substituted. 
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power and vulnerability (Baier 1986, 1991), which are already two of exploitation’s main 
ingredients. 
  I will discuss how relationships of trust in general can be exploitative, and will then move 
on to epistemic trust in particular.  
 
2.2 Exploitation and Trust 
 
The account of exploitation best suited to understanding this phenomenon in trust 
relationships is Wood’s (1995, 2014, chapter 12).3 One person exploits another when he takes 
advantage of her vulnerability, typically by exercising power over her, in order to achieve 
some gain. The exploited person typically gains too, though at a gouging price. For example, 
a water seller encounters a hiker lost in the desert and exploits her by selling her a bottle of 
water for €1,000.4 I’ll use exploiting a person and exploiting his vulnerability 
interchangeably.5 
 There are many forms of power and vulnerability that can feature in exploitation. One 
example is social; think of supervisors and students, members of majority or minority 
ethnicities, and so forth. Another is legal; think of someone’s legal claim being upheld and 
enforced against another. Another form of power and vulnerability is emotional: one person 
might be manipulative, whereas another is emotionally needy and so vulnerable to 
manipulation. Exploitation can occur along these dimensions of power and vulnerability, as 
well as others. 
 Vulnerability might come about as a result of coercion or manipulation. Coercion forces a 
person’s will by narrowing his acceptable alternatives, and manipulation covertly influences 
the deliberations that shape his will (Wood 2014, chapter 12). The water seller might have the 
hiker brought to the desert at gunpoint, or slyly convince her that the trail is lined with potable 
streams. But vulnerability can arise independently of coercion or manipulation: one party may 
simply enjoy a powerful bargaining advantage. The seller for instance might set up shop and 
wait for desperate hikers.  
  Exploitation is sometimes used as a moral concept, implying the badness of the situation 
that it applies to (e.g. Wertheimer 1996; Sample 2003). But it can also be used neutrally: a 
debater exploits the weaknesses in her opponent’s argument; a rescuer exploits a kidnapper’s 
vanity. This neutral sense is what I am interested in here. What typically distinguishes bad 
from neutral or good exploitation is that, in the former, the exploiter disrespects or degrades 
the exploitee (Wood 1995). Though most of my examples are of bad exploitation, I’ll discuss 
one virtuous case. 
  Relationships of trust necessarily incur vulnerability. They do so for the truster, because 
by definition he puts himself in the hands of the trustee – and she might fail to come through 
with the trusted-for end, or hurt him emotionally by not doing her best for him. On top of 
these vulnerabilities incurred by trust, the truster might have vulnerabilities that pre-exist it; 
they might even have made trust the best course of action to begin with (Baier 1986). The 
truster may for instance badly need the thing for which he trusts, and be unable to obtain it 
alone.  
 
3 One reason is that Wood’s account allows for morally neutral or even good cases of exploitation; another is 
that it captures exploitation in market as well as non-market circumstances. Wood makes a few distinctions that 
for simplicity I omit here. A close relative is the account of Sample (2003), except that she takes exploitation to 
be necessarily bad, which Wood (and I) deny. One way in which my view might be read as departing from 
Wood’s is that I allow for the possibility that one person can exploit another by accident. 
4 This example comes from Zwolinski and Wertheimer (2016). 
5 Some argue that exploitation entails that the exploited person is treated unfairly (e.g. Wertheimer 1996). But 
unfairness is hard to cash out, and may exclude the possibility, which I discuss below, of morally virtuous 
exploitation; for discussion see (Wood 1995). 
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  Yet trustees are vulnerable too (Baier 1986, 1991). Accepting trust incurs obligation, 
which is a mental and emotional burden, and perhaps, should things not go to plan, 
inconvenience.6 In addition to vulnerabilities incurred by trust, a trustee may have 
vulnerabilities apart from it, perhaps even accepting trust on account of them; she might for 
instance be lonely and welcome the emotional connection of being trusted, or might need the 
truster’s financial support. 
  Since both truster and trustee are vulnerable to the other, each might be exploited by the 
other. I’ll discuss two ways in which a trustee can exploit a truster, and one in which a truster 
can exploit a trustee.  
  A trustee can exploit a truster, first, by betraying him. She might do so by signaling 
acceptance of his trust while having no intention of fulfilling it – but since this sort of betrayal 
violates the authenticity norm (and hence is not a bona fide acceptance of trust), I will not 
discuss it here. Instead I will focus on betrayals that are unintentional – in which the trustee 
intends to deliver what she is being trusted for, but culpably fails to do so. For example, a 
contractor might use the cheapest available paint in a house without bothering to look into its 
chemical composition, inadvertently covering the occupants’ walls with toxins. Each element 
of exploitation is present: the occupants who trusted the contractor for a safe paint job pay a 
gouging price in the form of their future health (though they may not realize it), while the 
contractor gains financially as a result (though she may not realize the extent of the price that 
she has negligently imposed).  
  The second way in which a trustee can exploit a truster may come as a surprise: she might 
do so by fulfilling his trust. For example, a grown son might trust his parents for financial 
support, yet feel guilty about doing so; his parents might exploit his guilt at their acceptance 
of his trust by pushing him to end an engagement with a fiancée who displeases them.7 The 
son pays the price of his ruined relationship, while the parents gain by exerting control over 
the constellation of their extended family. 
  Exploitation in trust relationships can run in the other direction too, with trusters 
exploiting trustees – indeed, simply by trusting them. If someone asks you to accept his trust, 
refusing can be difficult, yet accepting, as we saw, can be burdensome. For example, a CEO 
trusts an unpaid intern, who needs this step-up in his career, to manage her ill-advised love 
affairs. Or you might trust your friend, who has a hard time saying no, to drop what she is 
doing and drive you to the airport. You can exploit someone, then, by imposing your trust on 
her.  
  The three forms of exploitation I will discuss, in summary, are those in which a trustee 
exploits a truster by betraying him unintentionally or by fulfilling his trust, and in which a 
truster exploits a trustee by imposing his trust on her.  
  One might object that the cases of exploitation I have described do not really involve 
relationships of trust. For trust relationships are characterized by cooperative submission to 
the norms of trust and by responsiveness to the relationship, whereas exploitation, at least of 
the bad variety, seems to involve violating norms for how to treat people and responding only 
to self-interest. 
  But our examples show that this objection is mistaken. The contractor authentically 
intends to perform a safe paint job, even though she does so with culpable incompetence. 
Moreover, she can do so in response to an aspect of her relationship with the occupants, such 
as their need for a paint job, or the obligation that she has incurred by accepting their trust. A 
similar point holds for the parents: they authentically want to financially support their guilt-
ridden son; and they do so in response to their relationship with him, whether they are 
motivated by their goodwill toward him or his future, or are simply committed, as his parents, 
 
6 Trusting incurs vulnerability by necessity; being trusted standardly does, but I will leave open whether it does 
so necessarily. 
7 This example is inspired by (Origgi 2009). 
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to coming through for him. They might even know (and indeed feel guilty) that they are 
exploiting him. And the son, even if he is aware that he is being exploited, nonetheless relies 
on his parents to respond to the relationship in these ways. Finally, consider the CEO. She is 
authentic about wanting her intern’s help, cooperates with him, and is disposed to gratitude 
when he takes her unfortunate paramours’ calls. Moreover, she can rely on him to be 
responsive to their relationship, which extends its tentacles deeper than his contract – he may 
pity her, be constitutionally unable to see a need go unmet when he can help, or experience 
goodwill toward the company with which he has cast his lot.  
  Exploitation, then, is compatible with relationships in which one person trusts another and 
the latter accepts his trust. I will turn now to exploitation in relationships of epistemic trust. 
 
3. Exploitation in Epistemic-Trust Relationships 
 
I’ll assume that epistemic trust is a species of trust generally, as opposed to mere reliance.8 I’ll 
focus on epistemic trust in testimony, in which a speaker tells something, say p, to a hearer. 
At least in the cases that I am interested in here, this amounts to the speaker’s inviting the 
hearer to trust her for knowledge that p (Hinchman 2005), and trusting him in turn to accord 
her epistemic recognition concerning her knowledge that p. To avoid confusion, I will refer to 
speakers of testimony as “she” and to hearers as “he”. 
  Consider first the hearer’s trust in the speaker. The epistemic goods that he trusts her for, 
such as knowledge or evidence, are what we may call representational. These either represent 
the world accurately, or indicate that a belief is likely to do so. A hearer who trusts a speaker 
for representational goods makes himself vulnerable – to misinformation, to practical 
mishaps, or to a strained relationship with the speaker should her testimony turn out false or 
careless. But the speaker, as trustee, is vulnerable too: having accepted the hearer’s trust, she 
has committed to providing him with knowledge. Should her testimony (to her surprise) turn 
out false or unfounded, she is vulnerable to the hearer’s reactive attitudes or to damage to her 
epistemic reputation. 
  It is standard for discussions of testimony, if they thematize trust at all, to focus on the 
hearer’s trust in the speaker (e.g. Faulkner 2007; Hinchman 2005; McMyler 2011); but the 
speaker too must typically trust the hearer (Dotson 2011, 238; Frost-Arnold 2016, 519-520). 
The epistemic goods for which she trusts him are what we may call recognitional (Hinchman 
2005, 565; M. Fricker 2007, 142-146). Recognitional epistemic goods consist in the right 
response to a person’s epistemic agency or to her status as a knower (Dotson 2011, 2014). 
They come in several forms. One amounts to ascribing a speaker the credibility that she 
deserves; another is crediting her when appropriate;9 another involves regarding her as the 
authority on how her words should be interpreted and on which third parties may be told 
them. The speaker, in trusting the hearer for these goods, makes herself vulnerable to the 
hearer (Dotson 2011). His disappointing or betraying her trust may dent her epistemic self-
confidence, or the confidence of onlookers in her (M. Fricker 2007; Hinchman 2005). It may 
inhibit her from sharing knowledge in the future, compromising epistemic agency (Dotson 
2011). She might even risk practical harms from the exposure of her sensitive information.  
 Yet the hearer too, in his capacity as a trustee for epistemic recognition, may also be 
vulnerable. If he fails to accord the speaker recognition that she deserves (say, he harbors 
unconscious prejudicial biases or accidentally lets slip her private information), he risks being 
targeted by her reactive attitudes, damaging his relationship to her, or gaining a reputation as 
closed-minded, untrustworthy, or even bigoted.  
 
8 For discussion see the Introduction to this volume, and (Frost-Arnold 2013). 
9 This is the flipside of Goldberg’s observation that the buck stops with the testifier (2006, 134; cf. Hinchman 
2005, 568): the testifier does not just bear responsibility, but also deserves credit. 
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  So epistemic trust in testimony is bi-directional: the hearer trusts the speaker for 
representational goods, and the speaker trusts the hearer for recognitional goods. Both parties 
are vulnerable to each other in their capacities as truster and trustee alike.  
  As we saw with trust in general, so too with epistemic trust: its vulnerabilities can arise 
from the epistemic-trust relationship itself, but need not. They can also precede or motivate it. 
For example, I trust you for knowledge because I am in ignorance, and you trust me for 
epistemic recognition because you need your story told. 
  Each party to an epistemic-trust relationship may be in a position to exploit the other. 
Since both speakers and hearers are trusters and trustees, and since exploitation can go both 
ways between truster and trustee, the following possibilities arise for exploitation in 
epistemic-trust relationships:  
 
  Types of Exploitative Trust in Testimony 
 
  The speaker exploiting the hearer: 
 (1) A speaker exploits a hearer’s trust for representational epistemic goods.  
  (2) A speaker exploitatively trusts a hearer for recognitional epistemic goods.  
 
  The hearer exploiting the speaker: 
  (3) A hearer exploits a speaker’s trust for recognitional epistemic goods.  
  (4) A hearer exploitatively trusts a speaker for representational epistemic goods.  
 
I’ll consider (1) and (2) as a unit, envisioning cases in which speakers exploit hearers by 
accepting their trust for knowledge, or by imposing trust for recognition on them (section 4).  
I will similarly examine (3) and (4) together, focusing on a case in which a hearer exploits a 
speaker by accepting her trust for recognition and by imposing on her his trust for knowledge 
(section 5). 
  The exploitation that I will discuss is epistemic. By this I mean that the core, or definitive 
feature, of the exploitative interaction is one party’s acceptance of the other’s trust for 
epistemic goods. A speaker epistemically exploits a hearer just in case the hearer’s trusting 
belief in her testimony, and his acceptance of her trust for epistemic recognition, benefits the 
speaker and costs the hearer in a way that takes advantage of a vulnerability of the hearer’s. A 
hearer epistemically exploits a speaker just in case the speaker’s trusting the hearer for 
recognition, and accepting his trust for knowledge, benefits the hearer and costs the speaker in 
a way that takes advantage of a vulnerability of the speaker’s. Finer distinctions can doubtless 
be drawn, but my present aim is to sketch the broad contours of a phenomenon which further 
research can fill in more precisely. 
 
4. The Speaker Exploiting the Hearer 
 
We saw two ways in which a speaker can exploit a hearer: in her capacity as a trustee for 
knowledge, and in her capacity as a truster for epistemic recognition. These forms of 
exploitation are conceptually distinct, but they typically intermingle. In this initial exploration 
I will consider cases in which they go together. I will consider two types of case: one in which 
the speaker betrays the hearer by testifying falsely and irresponsibly, thus failing to deserve 
the epistemic recognition that she trusts him for (section 4.1), and another in which the 
speaker testifies truly and responsibly, and does deserve his recognition (section 4.2).  
 
4.1 Betrayal of Trust for Knowledge, Failure to Deserve Epistemic Recognition 
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A speaker betrays a hearer when she lies to him or testifies a belief that she has formed 
carelessly. We may automatically exclude a lie from the cases of interest here, since a 
deceitful speaker violates the authenticity norm and hence is not even trying to do her part in 
the trust relationship. Testifying a belief that she has formed carelessly, by contrast, is 
compatible with a measure of trying, and so can be an unintentional betrayal. I will focus for 
simplicity on cases in which this unintentional betrayal is also a disappointment of the 
hearer’s trust: here, a failure to give him knowledge.10 One way in which this might happen is 
if the speaker holds the belief so carelessly that, even if it is true, she herself does not count as 
knowing it.11 Another way is for the belief to be false. In all of the cases I consider, the belief 
testified by the careless speaker disappoints the hearer’s trust by being false.  
  In the type of example that I will work with, the speaker is in a position of social power 
and the hearer is in a position of social vulnerability. More specifically, the speaker belongs to 
a group that is dominantly situated, and the hearer belongs to a group that is non-dominantly 
situated.12 In the example, this situation is upheld by systemic injustice. What the speaker 
testifies to the hearer is a false and disempowering narrative about the latter’s circumstances. 
This narrative, or legitimation myth (Stanley 2015, 211; cf. Dotson 2012; Collins 2000, 27), 
whitewashes the injustice of the situation and the responsibility borne by the speaker’s own 
group, instead casting blame on external circumstances, or more typically on the hearer’s 
group. For example, before women’s suffrage, democratically empowered men justified 
denying women the vote on the grounds that women were supposedly constitutionally 
unsuited to engaging in the public sphere – which many female opponents of suffrage 
accepted. For another example, it is not uncommon for the fantastically wealthy to excuse 
eye-watering economic disparities by claiming that their society is a pure meritocracy, 
implying that the economically disadvantaged simply do not work hard enough (Stanley 
2015).  
  Testifying a legitimation myth is not always a matter of stating it in so many words, but 
can also involve the use of loaded concepts, including stereotypes, in a way that assumes the 
hearer’s agreement. This happens when the speaker talks about something ostensibly different 
but builds the concept into her assertion in a way that presupposes the hearer’s acceptance of 
it (Collins 2000, 27; Stanley ibid.). Think of a well-meaning father talking about his political 
activities in martial terms that signal the inherent unladylikeness of politics to a daughter 
raised to aspire to ladylikeness.  
  A dominantly situated speaker who testifies a legitimation myth to a non-dominantly 
situated hearer epistemically exploits him, at least as long as he believes her (if he does he 
suffers from false consciousness). The hearer’s belief costs him, because it hides from him the 
truth about his situation. And it benefits the speaker, because it reduces the likelihood that the 
hearer will ask uncomfortable questions – and if he won’t, then who will? Moreover, the 
speaker in this case wins the hearer’s epistemic recognition, and secures his trust for 
knowledge, by taking advantage of certain vulnerabilities of the hearer’s that arise from his 
social location. To see this, note that part of what it is to be non-dominantly situated is for the 
vast majority of the knowledge claims prevalent in your society to be generated and passed on 
by people outside of your own group – by the dominantly situated (Collins 2000, 3-5; 
Scheman 2001; M. Fricker 2007; Grasswick 2018). Think of wealthy men, however well-
meaning, who indoctrinated their daughters that the rough-and-tumble of politics is better left 
 
10 Though some argue that the carelessness, or irresponsibility, of the speaker’s belief itself excludes it from 
counting as knowledge (e.g. Baehr 2011; Zagzebski 1996).  
11 Some argue that a hearer can count as knowing a truth that he receives from a speaker, even if the speaker 
herself does not count as knowing it; I won’t discuss this possibility, but see Greco (this volume).  
12 Talk of dominantly and non-dominantly situated social locations is of course simplistic. There are many 
respects in which a given person might be one or the other, and these categories admit of degree. I will ignore 
these complications here. 
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to the gallant sex. Or think of an affluent, idealistic young teacher working in an economically 
deprived school, teaching her students – with the best of intentions – that economic success is 
theirs for the taking as long as they work hard enough, irrespective of what they or their 
parents would have to sacrifice to afford college tuition in a culture of scant merit 
scholarships and rampant gaming of the system on the part of wealthy parents. 
  Of course, non-dominantly situated hearers could in theory find contrary views in critical 
work authored by non-dominantly situated thinkers, but – not being part of the mainstream 
conversation – it may take effort and resourcefulness to get ahold of.13 This is especially so if 
your non-dominant position comes with economic challenges, lack of opportunity, or social 
pressure to conform your thinking, and if the dominantly situated suppress the thought of 
those like you, for instance by making education hard to access (Collins 2000, 4-13, 33-34). 
  Non-dominantly situated hearers are not always vulnerable in this way, of course. As I 
will discuss in section 5.1, being non-dominantly situated can sometimes help one appreciate 
social realities, in ways not easily available to the dominantly situated (Harding 1993; Wylie 
2003, Medina 2013; Dotson 2018; McKinnon 2018). It is when these insights, for structural 
reasons, are hard to come by that epistemic exploitation of the nom-dominantly situated is a 
risk.  
  In the sort of case I am considering, the speaker exploits the hearer in two ways: first, by 
acting as a trustee for his knowledge; and second, by trusting him to grant her epistemic 
recognition – which, in the present case, she does not deserve.  
  Consider the speaker’s role as a trustee for knowledge. The speaker’s exploitation of the 
hearer here amounts to a betrayal of his epistemic trust. For her testimony is not only false; it 
violates the trying-your-best-within-reason norm. The speaker I am envisioning could and 
should have done better.14 This is certainly so if her testimony is a lie – that is, if she herself 
disbelieves it. Of greater relevance here, however, are cases in which the speaker herself 
believes the myth, but could have disbelieved it had she tried harder – had she thought more 
about it, regarded with suspicion the myth’s upholding of her own privilege, or engaged with 
non-dominantly situated thinkers who call the myth into question. Her betrayal is 
unintentional, but no less a betrayal for that. 
  One might wonder: if the speaker could have avoided believing the legitimation myth 
simply by trying harder, then so surely could the hearer – especially if intellectual 
groundwork has already been laid by thinkers from his own non-dominantly situated group. 
Why regard the speaker as blameworthy but not the hearer? In response, it is possible for a 
hearer to be blameworthy for his own false consciousness – anyone is capable of epistemic 
irresponsibility. Such cases aside, however, we have seen that, in the cases I am considering, 
there is a structural asymmetry between the epistemic situations of the dominantly and non-
dominantly situated. The former set the agenda for mainstream research programs and media 
offerings, whereas the latter must source their information from informal community 
channels, and may face practical barriers to doing so.  
  Let’s turn to the second way in which the speaker exploits the hearer: in her capacity as a 
truster for epistemic recognition. In their self-appointed role as the disseminators of 
knowledge-claims in their society, the dominantly situated impose this trust on everyone else. 
The well-meaning father schools his daughters to look to him for guidance about what 
interests to pursue; the affluent and idealistic teacher uses her influence to instill in her 
economically disadvantaged students the transformative belief in the power of hard work. Yet 
both speakers wind up taking advantage of their hearers – to impose trust for epistemic 
 
13 A situation which in our social-media age is fortunately changing in many parts of the world – though one 
must still have reliable internet access and the time to invest, neither of which is a given. 
14 We may grant that exceptions are possible: some dominantly situated speakers may simply see the world 
through the lens of the myth (Srivinasan 2016), so that even their best efforts do not yield evidence against it. 
Such speakers would disappoint hearers’ trust, but do not count as betraying it. 
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recognition which, in this case, neither speaker deserves on the topic at hand, and from which 
each benefits by upholding the status quo with their testimony. 
  In summary, a speaker can exploit a hearer by betraying his trust for knowledge, and by 
imposing on him her trust for epistemic recognition which, when she is disposed to 
irresponsibly testify falsehoods, she does not deserve.  
 
4.2 Fulfillment of Trust for Knowledge, Imposition of Trust for Deserved Recognition 
 
A speaker can exploit a hearer without testifying carelessly, or even falsely. She can do so in 
fulfillment of his trust for knowledge, and by imposing on him trust for epistemic recognition 
that she also deserves.  
 Consider a board meeting, where each person is of equal rank, equally qualified, and 
supposed to be accorded an equal voice. Yet the creative director, who skillfully wields her 
off-the-charts charisma, speaks disproportionately often. She happens also to be highly 
knowledgeable and hence, in this regard, deserving of significant epistemic recognition. But 
her disproportionate occupation of the conversational space prevents the other group members 
from asserting their knowledge. The creative director’s emotional power thus cultivates in her 
emotionally vulnerable (because timid) hearers an epistemically vicious habit of cognitive 
subservience. In this way the speaker epistemically exploits her colleagues. Their acceptance 
of her trust for epistemic recognition feeds her narcissism, and their belief of her testimony 
shapes the group’s decisions to her interests. It is true that the other group members gain 
knowledge, but they also pay a steep price, in the form of a surrender of their epistemic and 
practical agency within the group. 
  Cases like this have consequences for an important idea in the epistemology of testimony. 
This idea is that a speaker, simply in virtue of testifying, is entitled to expect epistemic 
recognition from the hearer. More specifically, she is entitled to expect a hearer, not to believe 
her automatically, but to treat her testimony as a serious candidate for belief (Goldberg, 
unpublished manuscript). Her testimony exerts “moral pressure” on him to “tailor his doxastic 
reaction” to her epistemic credentials, “so as to reflect a proper estimate of the epistemic 
goodness of [her] claimed [epistemic] authority”.15 In other words, the speaker is entitled, 
simply in virtue of testifying, to expect the hearer to open himself up to the possibility that he 
ought to believe her, by duly considering her credentials; and if they are good, then she is 
entitled to expect the additional epistemic recognition of being believed. I will call this the 
speaker-expectation claim.  
  This claim has much going for it. A speaker arguably has a right to be offended if her 
testimony is ignored or epistemically downgraded without due cause (Faulkner 2011; 
Goldberg, unpublished manuscript; Moran 2005) – and if a hearer does this because of 
prejudice, he commits an epistemic injustice to boot (M. Fricker 2007).  
  But the speaker-expectation claim, as Goldberg himself acknowledges,16 needs 
qualification. For competing considerations can sometimes override the moral pressure to 
meet a speaker’s expectation. I will discuss two; both become apparent when we consider 
ways in which a knowledgeable speaker can exploit a hearer by imposing on him her trust for 
epistemic recognition, and by accepting his trust for knowledge.  
  The first circumstance in which the speaker-expectation claim can be voided arises when 
the speaker already commands a disproportionate amount of epistemic airtime. This is 
illustrated by our narcissistic-speaker case, in which the creative director, though 
 
15 This response need not be a conscious evaluation of her epistemic credentials; Goldberg intends this claim to 
be compatible with any theory of testimonial justification. 
16 Personal communication. 
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knowledgeable, drowns out other equally deserving voices.17 In such cases hearers surely 
have a right or even a duty to disappoint the speaker’s expectation to be heard – any teacher 
who has had confident students stifle class participation can sympathize. The very fact that 
someone testifies does not suffice to license prioritizing her claim to supply knowledge over 
others’. On the contrary: the epistemic airtime should be more evenly apportioned among 
those equally deserving of being heard. There are moral reasons for this, but also epistemic 
ones: a variety of knowledgeable perspectives is likely to be more epistemically enriching 
than one  (Longino 2002; De Cruz and De Smedt 2013; Dormandy 2019)  
  A second circumstance in which the speaker-expectation claim can be voided arises when 
the hearer has a right not to know what the speaker testifies. The following case of epistemic 
exploitation brings this out. Imagine two friends, a speaker and a hearer. The speaker is a 
reservoir of lascivious secrets – about herself, about mutual friends – and her exhilaration in 
knowing them is incomplete until she gains a feeling of self-importance by sharing them with 
someone else. Her friend the hearer is caring, but has trouble setting boundaries. Knowing his 
friend’s secrets, let alone keeping them confidential, makes him desperately uncomfortable. 
What he gains is the feeling of being important to his friend; but he pays the steep price of his 
peace of mind. The speaker is knowledgeable and fulfills the hearer’s reluctant epistemic trust 
– but in doing so, and in imposing her trust for epistemic recognition on him, she 
epistemically exploits him. 
  This scenario generates a second exception to the speaker-expectation claim. The secret-
teller is not entitled to expect her friend to hear her testimony at all, let alone attend to her 
epistemic credentials; the reason is that he has a right not to know the secrets.18 Asking her to 
stop testifying would not amount to an epistemically reprehensive silencing, but would rather 
protect both himself and the dignity of the subjects of the secrets.  
  The right not to know is not absolute. There are truths that ought to be known, and hearers 
who ought to know them. A criminal hearer arguably lacks the right to be ignorant of how he 
has harmed a victim, especially if his knowing this can contribute to her healing. There may 
even be truths, for example about genocides, that there is an intrinsic moral or epistemic 
impetus for human beings to know. So there is no across-the-board right not to know; but the 
fact that there is in some contexts is enough to provide a second exception to the speaker-
expectation claim. 
  In summary, there are at least two circumstances in which the speaker-expectation claim 
does not apply: those in which the speaker occupies a disproportionate amount of 
conversational space, and those in which the hearer has a right not to know what is being 
testified. 
  We have reached this conclusion by exploring cases in which speakers exploit their 
hearers by testifying knowledgeably. But epistemic exploitation does not always override the 
speaker-expectation claim. The exploitation might for instance be virtuous. Think of a truth 
and reconciliation commission empowered to hold perpetrators to account, which gives 
victims the opportunity to testify about their suffering at their hands. The perpetrators, now 
under arrest, are legally and physically vulnerable. Many would not have decided to use this 
situation to turn their lives around were they still on the loose, but imprisonment has jolted 
them to reflect on the direction of their lives and they are willing, though emotionally 
conflicted, to try. So even though the speaker’s trust for recognition is imposed, the criminal 
hearers choose optimistically to accept it, taking a positive attitude toward the project of truth 
and reconciliation or even (perhaps begrudgingly) toward the speaker herself. And in the 
 
17 Frost-Arnold (2014, p. 794) characterizes the behavior of overly vocal testifiers as “occupying space in 
[epistemic] trust networks”. 
18 This right may be moral, insofar as being told things can have practical or emotional consequences. But it 
might also be epistemic, insofar as a person is entitled to prioritize knowing some things over others. Watson 
(2018) introduces the notion of an epistemic right, but does not discuss a right not to know certain things. 
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same way that one chooses a painful dental procedure, the perpetrators choose to trust her for 
knowledge about how they harmed her, relying, if not on her goodwill, then at least on her 
commitment to the common project. This scenario has all the ingredients of epistemic 
exploitation: the speaker takes advantage of the hearers’ vulnerability in order to extract 
something from them (in this case the emotional and moral closure supplied by their 
epistemic recognition and belief) – but at great cost to them (in this case forcing them to 
confront their own worst selves). And the speaker-expectation claim holds: the hearers do not 
have a right to remain in ignorance of her testimony. Epistemic exploitation, then, does not 
automatically yield exceptions to the speaker-expectation claim – but it certainly can.  
  In summary, a speaker can epistemically exploit a hearer by fulfilling his trust for 
knowledge, and by imposing on him her trust for epistemic recognition. The stiff price paid 
by the hearer can take any number of forms, including his knowing things that he does not 
want to know – though if these are things that he epistemically or morally ought to know, the 
exploitation can be virtuous. These considerations indicate that speakers are often entitled to 
epistemic recognition from hearers, and thus to their epistemic trust, but not all the time. 
  This leaves us with two ways in which a speaker can epistemically exploit a hearer: first, 
by betraying (and disappointing) his trust for knowledge and by imposing on him her trust for 
epistemic recognition that she does not deserve; and second, by fulfilling his trust for 
knowledge and imposing on him her trust for epistemic recognition that she does deserve. 
  This ends my initial exploration of how speakers can epistemically exploit hearers. I’ll 
now turn to the way in which hearers can reciprocate. 
 
5. The Hearer Exploiting the Speaker 
 
A hearer of testimony can also epistemically exploit a speaker. He can do so in his capacity as 
a trustee for epistemic recognition, as well as in his capacity as a truster for knowledge. I will 
consider a single example that features both forms of exploitation simultaneously.  
  The speaker I am thinking of is non-dominantly situated, whereas the hearer is dominantly 
situated.19 The speaker’s testimony concerns what it is like to swim against the current of a 
legitimation myth, and the social insights that she has gained from having to do so. That non-
dominantly situated people are often in a position to acquire social knowledge of this sort, 
indeed a better one than dominantly situated people, is a possibility from section 4.1 that we 
will now consider more closely. One reason for this is negative: being dominantly situated 
can prevent one from seeing certain things. One is apt to lack the sorts of experiences that 
would most strongly call the legitimation myth into question. On top of this, one has an 
interest in upholding the myth – after all, one’s own privilege is precisely what it legitimates – 
so one might fail to find the time to ask certain questions or entertain certain possibilities 
(Mills 2007; Spelman 2007). Moreover, the legitimation myth is apt to influence one’s very 
perception, making evidence against it difficult even to see (Srivinasan 2016). A second 
reason why the non-dominantly situated may be in a better position to acquire knowledge of 
social injustices is positive: their daily lives are impacted by legitimation myths. They are 
confronted with the effects of implicit prejudices, credibility deficits, or knee-jerk suspicion, 
which the dominantly situated can afford to ignore. Although they too might, as we saw in 
section 4.1, perceive the world through the lens of the myth, they are also, arguably, more 
likely than the dominantly situated to notice ways in which it does not add up – because it is 
their experiences that it is least likely to match (Collins 2000, 35). A third reason – also 
positive – is that the non-dominantly situated often live in the same communities, excluded 
from dominantly situated ones by social or economic pressure, providing the opportunity to 
discourse together (Collins 2000,  9-13). 
 
19 See footnote 12 about how this dichotomy is an oversimplification. 
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  The non-dominantly situated speaker I am considering has social knowledge of this sort, 
and the dominantly situated hearer lacks it. Because of this, the speaker deserves epistemic 
recognition from the hearer on the scale of an ascription of epistemic authority. I will discuss 
how the hearer might exploit the speaker by accepting her trust for recognition (5.1) and by 
imposing on her his trust for the truth (5.2). 
 
5.1 Exploiting the Speaker’s Trust for Epistemic Recognition 
 
A hearer might exploit a speaker’s trust for recognition by betraying it or, perhaps 
surprisingly, by fulfilling it. I’ll consider each possibility in turn. But first we need a word on 
the recognitional goods for which the speaker trusts the hearer. I’ll discuss the following four:  
  (i) The speaker trusts the hearer to assess her credibility accurately. This includes trusting 
that he will not, due for example to vices such as epistemic laziness (Medina 2013), simply 
decline to engage with her testimony, but will respond appropriately given her epistemic 
credentials: believing her if they are good, and disbelieving her only if they are substandard. It 
also includes trusting that he will not perpetrate testimonial injustice against her – that is, that 
he will not, due to epistemically negative stereotypes, assign her less credibility than she 
deserves (Fricker 2007; Dotson 2011; Saul 2013; Peet 2017).20 
  (ii) The speaker trusts the hearer to exercise testimonial competence (a term coined by 
Dotson 2011, 245); i.e., to do what it takes to hear what she intends to communicate. This 
includes working to grasp her concepts rather than expecting her to formulate her claims in 
his – think of the difference between “flirting” and “sexually harassing”. It includes 
recognizing that there may not even be concepts adequate to express her meaning; after all, 
their common conceptual framework is likely keyed to the experiences and concerns of the 
dominantly situated, including to sustaining legitimation myths (cf. M. Fricker 2007, ch. 7) –  
think of someone trying to explain that she was sexually harassed before this term was coined 
(ibid.). A testimonially competent hearer is also open to the possibility that any failure to 
understand is his doing rather than the speaker’s (Dotson 2011; Peet 2017). This is important 
given that the going epistemic norms, also shaped by and for the dominantly situated, are apt 
to license “default skeptical responses” to the testimony of the non-dominantly situated 
(Berenstain 2016, 578-581), putting the burden of proof on the speaker to show that her words 
make sense, rather than on the hearer to understand. Finally, testimonial competence includes 
the willingness to engage critically, within the confines of ascribing the speaker epistemic 
authority (Narayan 2004). 
  (iii) The speaker trusts the hearer to respect her agency regarding the content her 
testimony. This involves, among other things, trusting that he will not spin or “touch up” her 
story to third parties (even in an attempt to help), and will not take her words out of context 
(Alcoff 1991/1992, 9). This is important to facilitate the speaker’s self-expression, but also 
because, should the hearer misinterpret her testimony, it is his take and not hers which is apt 
to gain currency.  
  (iv) The speaker trusts the hearer to respect any risks to which her testimony might expose 
her. These risks are emotional and may also be practical. It is often emotionally trying to 
explain experiences of marginalization to someone who is likely to have trouble relating, 
especially if their shared conceptual framework cannot easily bridge their disparate 
backgrounds. The emotional risks are greater to the extent that the hearer (even if well-
meaning) lacks testimonial competence (Berenstain 2016). The speaker may also face 
 
20 That a speaker trusts a hearer in these ways does not, however, entail that she is always entitled to do so; we 
saw (section 4.2) that the speaker-expectation claim, which says that she is, can be voided. If – and only if – 
there is a case in which it does not apply, the hearer does nothing wrong by declining to assess the speaker’s 
credibility. 
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practical consequences, such as being seen as a troublemaker and thus treated with suspicion, 
for example, in applying for jobs or university admission. 
  So non-dominantly situated speakers tend to be vulnerable in testifying about their 
experiences as non-dominant and about the resulting social insights. The situation is ripe for 
exploitation. I’ll start by discussing how the hearer might exploit the speaker by betraying her 
trust for epistemic recognition. I’ll then discuss how he might even exploit her if he fulfills 
her trust.  
  One way in which a hearer could betray a speaker is by violating the authenticity norm: 
accepting her trust for recognition with no intention of delivering. He might solicit it 
cynically, aiming to discredit her (Berenstain 2016). Or he might aim to come across as 
socially sensitive to certain third parties without caring to engage with her message. But 
breaches of authenticity, as we saw, disqualify the relationship from counting as full-fledged 
trust and hence are not my primary concern. Can a hearer betray a speaker’s trust for 
recognition, even if he accepts it in good faith? He can. Let’s take each type of recognition in 
turn: (i) The speaker might, due to carelessness, culpable ignorance, or prejudicial 
stereotypes, grant the speaker less credibility than she deserves. (ii) He may culpably fail to 
exhibit the skills and background information required for testimonial competence. (iii) His 
good intentions might have a paternalistic edge: he may think that re-casting the speaker’s 
story (a form of silencing) will help her express or even process it. (iv) He may 
paternalistically think that the speaker’s story is too important not to be heard and, naïvely 
declining to empathize with her situation, share it with others.21 
  Betrayal of trust for epistemic recognition, even when unintentional, can assume even 
darker forms, if the speaker’s testimony surprises the hearer and awakens his baser instincts. 
He might for instance take offense at feedback about his own unintentional yet problematic 
behavior, perhaps making the incident about his feelings instead of his misdeed (Pohlhaus 
2016); or he might gaslight the speaker, claiming (and falsely believing) that she is 
overreacting (McKinnon 2017). 
  Betrayal of a speaker’s trust for epistemic recognition, even when unintentional, can be 
exploitative. We have already seen what gouging price the speaker might pay, but what can 
the hearer gain? If he betrays her in a way that is compatible with understanding and believing 
her testimony, he gains knowledge on an important matter. If he believes what he takes her to 
have said but in fact misunderstands it, he does not gain knowledge, but he might still 
experience self-congratulatory emotions, thinking that he is promoting social understanding. 
What if the hearer’s unintentional betrayal involves disbelieving her, for example by culpably 
ascribing her too little credibility? Here too there are non-epistemic ways in which he might 
gain. He may experience the self-satisfaction (or self-righteousness) of feeling that he has 
done his part vis-à-vis the speaker and her social group. Or he might, by reading his own 
meaning into her words, feel self-righteously that his exchange with the speaker confirms his 
favorite legitimation myth. 
  All of the elements of exploitation can thus arise when even a well-meaning dominantly 
situated hearer accepts the trust for epistemic recognition of a non-dominantly situated 
speaker. 
  So far I have discussed only a hearer who betrays the speaker’s trust for epistemic 
recognition. But he can exploit her even if he fulfills it – that is, even if he accords her the 
credibility that she deserves, models testimonial competence, cedes control of her narrative, 
and honors her risks. He might for example use her trust – even as he fully recognizes her 
epistemically – to gain access to her bank account. But more interesting are cases in which the 
 
21 It is possible for the hearer to merely disappoint the speaker’s trust rather than betray it, if he is non-culpably 
inexperienced. But epistemic culpability can run more deeply than we are inclined to think (Spelman 2007; Mills 
2007). 
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mechanism of exploitation is not the hearer’s fulfillment of the speaker’s trust for recognition, 
but rather his own trust in her for her knowledge. I’ll turn now to cases like this.  
 
5.2 Exploiting the Speaker by Imposing Trust for Knowledge 
 
Recall that accepting someone’s trust can be a burden, even if you do it willingly. If you are a 
speaker and you accept a hearer’s trust for knowledge, there are cases in which his trusting 
you can be exploitative. 
  Let’s continue our example from section 5.1, in which a dominantly situated hearer trusts 
a non-dominantly situated speaker for knowledge. I’ll focus on the case in which what the 
hearer gains is knowledge, though (as we have seen) there may be secondary benefits such as 
the feel-good sense that he is helping to right social wrongs. What the speaker gains is the 
opportunity to shape views on a topic of importance. But accepting the hearer’s trust for 
knowledge can nonetheless be burdensome, coming with significant opportunity costs to her 
emotional energy, time, and other life-goals (Berenstain 2016, 572-575). She might for 
instance forfeit the opportunity to develop or express other aspects of her identity beyond 
those in virtue of which she represents a non-dominant social group. As a result, hearers 
might perceive her one-dimensionally, as no more than a representative of her group (Collins 
2000). And even well-meaning hearers might treat her patronizingly, expecting her to be 
grateful for their interest or even to drop other activities for the sake of their social education 
(Berenstain 2016, 572-575). The speaker may accept these costs in the hope of making a 
positive epistemic difference, but is no less exploited for that.  
  If even a well-intentioned hearer can wind up exploiting a willing speaker, it might seem 
that epistemic exploitation is unavoidable in epistemic-trust relationships of this kind. Are 
there ways of pursuing such relationships while avoiding it, or at least minimizing its impact?  
  There are. The hearer might first do his research. There is an array of scholarly and 
popular resources in which non-dominantly situated thinkers from a variety of social locations 
narrate and systematize their experiences and insights. Rather than expect any given non-
dominantly situated person to spontaneously condense and recite these results, the hearer can 
take advantage of this work. Indeed, given (as we saw in section 5.1) that there may be still 
evolving forms of expression that many non-dominantly situated people do not themselves 
have access to, a hearer who does this research could shoulder a large amount of the 
conversational burden should he still opt for a face-to-face discussion. The hearer might also, 
instead of expecting the speaker to educate him pro bono, offer a more equitable exchange for 
the opportunity costs that his epistemic trust imposes. On top of this, he might work 
independently, through political advocacy or talking to his dominantly situated friends, to put 
an end to the system that leaves speakers like her at a social disadvantage to begin with. 
  In summary, even a hearer trusting in good faith can epistemically exploit a speaker, but 
there are measures that he could take to reduce, and perhaps obliterate, the badness of any 
given case.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
I have discussed a phenomenon at the intersection of several independently significant forms 
of human interaction: trust, testimony, and exploitation. Because the aim was a systematic 
overview of exploitation in epistemic-trust relationships, it was necessary to leave many 
details undiscussed. But I hope that this initial systematization will motivate further 
exploration.  
  To summarize: in epistemic-trust relationships, a hearer trusts a speaker for knowledge 
and accepts her trust for epistemic recognition, and a speaker trusts a hearer for epistemic 
recognition and accepts his trust for knowledge. What marks their relationship as one of trust, 
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instead of mere reliance, is that each party has normative expectations of the other and is 
responsive to some aspect of the relationship. There are many ways in which relationships of 
epistemic trust can be exploitative. A speaker can exploit a hearer by accepting his trust for 
knowledge (whether she fulfills or inadvertently betrays it), and by imposing on him her trust 
for epistemic recognition. And a hearer can exploit a speaker through by inadvertently 
betraying her trust for epistemic recognition, or by imposing on her his trust for knowledge.  
  Our discussion has yielded a few results for social epistemology more generally. One is 
that it is not only hearers who trust speakers in a testimonial exchange, but also speakers who 
trust hearers. Second, although speakers have a prima facie entitlement to have their 
knowledge claims considered, this entitlement can be canceled if there are other, less vocal, 
speakers equally deserving of airtime, or if the hearer has a right not to know what is being 
testified. Third, a hearer can exploit a speaker’s trust for recognition in spite of his best 
intentions not to; this reinforces the idea that testimonial competence is a virtue, or bundle of 
virtues, that takes work to cultivate. Fourth, epistemic exploitation can take morally virtuous 
forms. I hope that these results are just the beginning.22 
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